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1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate firm characteristics associated with the choice 
of individual versus group compensation schemes for senior executives below the CEO.  
Individual compensation schemes are defined where senior executives are compensated 
independently from other senior executives, with incentive compensation linked to individual 
performance.  In contrast, group compensation schemes are those where senior executive 
compensation is jointly determined with other senior executives, with incentive compensation 
linked to common incentive structures.   
The motivation for this study is two fold.  First, despite both public and academic scrutiny, 
little is known about how senior executives’ are compensated.  The link between the economic 
determinants of CEO compensation levels and structure (e.g., Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Core and Guay, 1999; Wright, 2005) has been extensively 
evaluated.1  However, the economic determinants of compensation schemes for senior executives 
below the CEO level has received significantly less attention.  This is despite evidence that these 
senior executives are important to the firm.  Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) find the sum of the 
top five executives’ compensation packages increased from 5.0% to 9.8% of net income between 
1993-1995 and 2001-2003.  Less than 40% of this increase is explained by factors such as 
increasing firm size, market performance and industry factors.2  Also, Core and Larcker (2002) 
and Hillegeist and Penalva (2004) find that the level of senior executives’ equity ownership and 
equity compensation incentives are positively associated with improvements in firm 
                                                 
1 Further, the link between firm performance and CEO compensation has also been extensively documented (e.g., 
Murphy, 1999; Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003; Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1996; Jensen and Murphy, 2004; 
Matolcsy and Wright, 2006). 
2 They also find that increased use of options in compensation packages does not explain the increasing levels of 
senior executive team compensation. 
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performance.  On the other hand, Frye (2004) finds mixed evidence of such a relation between 
the level of senior executive equity compensation and firm performance.  The literature to date 
has not investigated alternative compensation schemes for senior executives.3  The lack of 
empirical evidence on the appropriateness of different compensation schemes limits critical 
evaluation of the efficiency of senior executives’ compensation more broadly. 
Second, contributing to the lack of empirical evidence on senior executives’ compensation 
is limited data availability (Bushman and Smith, 2001), necessitating the use of proprietary and 
survey data sets.4  Increased disclosure of senior executives’ compensation schemes as a 
consequence of recent changes to reporting requirements in Australia has resulting in increased 
data availability and reliability.5   
This study adopts a contracting theory perspective where the owners of the firm 
(shareholders or their representatives, the board of directors) contract with senior executives to 
reduce agency costs.  It is predicted that individual compensation schemes are adopted by firms 
where individual senior executive’s input (effort) and outputs are separable and observable.  This 
is because a closer nexus between individual effort and pay provides incentives for senior 
executives to exert greater effort.  Further, individual compensation schemes are expected to 
reduce the propensity for senior executives to free-ride.  Group compensation schemes are 
adopted where there are expected efficiencies from senior executive co-operation and 
interdependencies between executives, such as in integrated firms.  This is because group 
                                                 
3 Notable exceptions are Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1993) and Carpenter and Sanders (2004).  Main et al (1993) find 
a positive association between individual compensation schemes and average firm ROA.  On the other hand, 
Carpenter and Sanders (2004) find support against individual compensation scheme as a predictor of firm 
performance in complex firms that require increased co-operation between senior executives. 
4 Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith (1995) are typical of studies that address executive compensation below the CEO 
level.  They rely on limited, proprietary survey data in their study of division managers.  Keating (1997) also used 
survey date and is limited to a sample of firms with a divisional structure, reducing the generalizability of results.  
5 The compensation details disclosed in annual reports are also more reliable than survey data because they are 
subject to independent auditing. 
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compensation schemes provide an incentive for senior executives to exert effort toward common 
objectives, increase information sharing and co-operation between executives as well as 
increasing mutual monitoring.  Integrated firms are expected to benefit from increased co-
operation between senior executives.   
Three different methods have been developed to proxy for the type of compensation 
scheme adopted.6  Although firms disclose general information about compensation schemes and 
the nexus between pay and performance, they are not explicitly required to specify whether there 
is predominantly an individual or group compensation scheme in place for the senior executives.  
The lack of precision in disclosures and cross sectional variation in disclosure quality introduces 
a level of subjectivity in identifying the type of compensation scheme in place making an 
objective assessment of compensation scheme type based on textual disclosures difficult.  To 
address the level of subjectivity and precision, this study develops alternative proxies for 
classification of compensation schemes.  Where senior executives are paid predominantly on 
common performance (group compensation scheme), there is correlation between executives’ 
compensation.  On the other hand, where senior executives’ are paid predominantly on 
individual performance, there will be less of a relation between senior executive compensation 
payments.  This allows for development of proxies based upon the level of correlation between 
executives’ compensation levels and structure.  The first method used in this study is extent 
changes in compensation vary between senior executives.  The second method is the variation in 
the type of compensation used in senior executives’ compensation contracts (short term cash 
bonus versus long term compensation).  The third method is the variation in the relative weight 
of incentive compensation to base pay between senior executives.   
                                                 
6 For a full description of how these variables are estimated, please see table two. 
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Firm characterised by increased observability of senior executives inputs (effort) and 
output are proxied by the level of industry and geographic diversification using the sum of the 
number of different geographic or industry segments.  The level of firm integration is estimated 
by the level of interdependencies between geographic and industry segments, level of capital 
expenditure and functional organisational structure. 
Preliminary findings are based on a limited sample so need to be interpreted with caution.7  
Preliminary evidence using Australian data provides support that individual compensation 
schemes are adopted by firms where individual senior executive inputs (effort) and outputs are 
separable and observable.  We also find support that group compensation schemes are adopted 
where there are efficiencies from senior executive co-operation and interdependencies between 
executives, such as in integrated firms.  The empirical evidence suggest that there are important 
differences between how firms set changes in total compensation as apposed to the mix of long 
and short term incentive components.  
The evidence is based on a sample of 640 firm year observations drawn from the ASX Top 
500 firms between 2003 and 2005.  Data on senior executives and senior executives’ 
compensation is obtained from the UTS-Accenture ‘Who Governs Australia’ database, while 
financial statement data is sourced from Aspect – Huntley databases.  Information not available 
from these sources is obtained directly from annual reports. 
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature.  First, this study contributes to 
the ongoing debate surrounding the determination of appropriate corporate governance 
mechanisms in the presence of agency conflicts, and especially executive compensation 
schemes.  Concern with senior executives’ compensation is evidenced by increased disclosure 
requirements for executive compensation and the requirement for a non-binding resolution by 
                                                 
7 Further results will be forthcoming as more data are collected. 
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shareholders on senior executives’ compensation packages.8  However, the efficiency of these 
regulatory developments is not considered in either the empirical or analytical literature.  This 
study provides a framework for evaluating the structure of senior executives’ compensation 
within an agency framework.  This is informative not only for regulators, but also shareholders 
concerned with how to vote on these schemes.   
Second, this study contributes to the practitioner literature by investigating the 
circumstances under which group or individual compensation schemes are predominantly used 
by firms for the senior executives.  This contribution is relevant because the practitioner-based 
literature offers conflicting guidance on the efficiency of group versus individual compensation 
schemes (Autrey, 2005).  Some of the practitioner-based literature champions the role of group 
compensation schemes to improve group task performance (Weitzel, 2002; Lawford, 2003).  
Others argue that it is necessary to combine both group and individual compensation schemes to 
induce increased group task performance (Parker, McAdams and Zielinski, 2000) or fail to 
consider compensation contracts at all when considering group task performance (Eppler and 
Sukowski, 2000; Jarzabkowski and Searle, 2004).  By providing empirical evidence on the firm 
characteristics associated with compensation scheme choice for senior executives, this study 
builds an empirically tested model that can be used by practitioners in guiding the structuring of 
executive compensation schemes.  This model also allows a critical evaluation of the 
practitioner-based literature. 
                                                 
8 The introduction in 2005 of a non binding vote on Australian senior executives compensation contracts by 
shareholders makes this study timely (introduced with CLERP 9).  Reports on investors exercising the new non 
binding vote on remuneration packages indicate that some investors are exercising this right.  35% of investors 
voted against the remuneration report for Investa Property Group; 19% voted against Rinker’s remuneration report; 
11% voted against West Australian Newspapers remuneration report (Durie, 2005).  GlaxoSmithKline altered its 
CEO remuneration package after shareholders exercised a non binding vote against the package (Sykes, 2005). 
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The remainder of this study is organised as follows.  Section 2 reviews relevant literature 
and develops the theory.  Section 3 describes the research design.  Section 4 reports the results 
(preliminary results at present) and section 5 contains the conclusions and limitations.  Section 6 
presents topics for further research. 
 
2 Theory Development and Hypotheses 
 
Agency Theory and CEO Compensation Schemes 
The extant analytical and empirical literature does not provide direct insights into the 
relation between senior executives’ compensation scheme choice (group versus individual 
compensation) and specific firm characteristics.9  However, the relation between CEO 
compensation and firm characteristics has been considered extensively, and this forms the 
theoretical foundation for this study. 
Consistent with a significant body of literature evaluating executive compensation schemes 
(and the choice of governance mechanisms more generally), this study adopts an agency theory 
perspective of the firm.  This framework views the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ between the 
various providers of factors of production, and with control of the factors of production residing 
with the firm’s management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This is problematic as the separation 
of ownership and management (control) exposes the owners of the factors of production 
(principals) to the risk of opportunistic behaviour by managers (agent), with resultant loss in firm 
value being described as an agency cost (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Subject to economic 
constraints, the firm minimizes total agency costs by enacting bonding and monitoring 
mechanisms.  Executive compensation schemes are one such bonding mechanism. 
                                                 
9 Key exceptions are Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993), Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) and Carpenter and 
Sanders (2004) who consider tournament and equity theory with limited success. 
 8
The agency framework has provided the theoretical foundation for a substantial body of 
literature evaluating CEO compensation contracts.10  This literature is based on the premise that 
the CEO is employed with the primary objective of increasing shareholder value.  However, as 
CEOs are rational, they have incentives to take actions that maximise their own utility, 
sometimes to the detriment of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Agency problems 
arise when the CEO has goals that are not congruent with the maximizing of shareholder value.  
The extant literature has investigated how to align shareholder and CEO interests by minimising 
goal discongruence through compensation contracts and by monitoring CEO actions.   
There are important cross-sectional differences in terms of levels and structure of CEO 
compensation contracts across different firms.  Although most firms offer base salary, cash 
bonus and equity or options, the levels and structure of CEO pay varies between industries, 
countries and firm size (Murphy, 1999).  The reasons behind the variation in levels and structure 
can be understood in part by considering the different incentives induced by variation in 
compensation contract design.  The cash bonus is usually linked to short term performance 
measures over a one year period, providing an incentive for CEOs to exert effort that increases 
short term performance (Murphy, 1999).  Equity grants are usually in the form of option grants 
and provide an incentive for the CEO to focus on long term performance in an effort to increase 
share price (Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Murphy, 1999).  On the other hand, in some cases options 
are issued in the money as a reward for prior performance (Matolcsy, Riddell and Wright, 2005).  
Although both short term and long term compensation contracts encourage CEOs to take positive 
actions, albeit focusing on different issues, in some cases compensation contracts provide 
incentives for CEOs to take actions that may not benefit shareholders (Murphy, 1999).  For 
                                                 
10 This study does not attempt to provide a review of this literature.  For comprehensive reviews of the executive 
compensation literature see Murphy (1999), Prendergast (1999), Bushman and Smith (2001), Conyon, Peck and 
Read (2001), Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) and Jensen and Murphy (2004).   
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example, using performance benchmarks provides an incentive for the CEO to influence the 
benchmark setting process in order to reduce the level of effort needed to satisfy the 
compensation contract.  Granting executive option’s provides an incentive for the CEO to 
encourage investment into risky projects (Wright, 2005) or backdate options (Lie, 2005) thereby 
increasing the value of the option contract.  Given the prevalence of agency problems, the 
question of how to structure CEO compensation contracts has been given significant attention in 
the academic literature.   
As different compensation structures give the CEO incentives to focus effort on different 
issues, firms have the opportunity to customise the CEO’s compensation to minimise agency 
costs.  Consistent with agency theory predictions, empirical evidence suggests that the 
underlying characteristics of the firm determine the efficiency of different CEO compensation 
contracts (Core, Holthausen, Larcker, 1999; Wright, 2005).  For example, firms place greater 
emphasis on options over cash compensation where the firm is cash constrained or where there is 
favourable accounting treatment of option grants (Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003; Matolcsy and 
Wright, 2006).  Also, firms with weaker governance structures are exposed to higher agency cost 
including opportunistic actions by the executives, such as greater CEO compensation and lower 
firm performance (Core et al, 1999).  Where monitoring of the CEO is difficult, firms are more 
likely to offer options as a bonding mechanism, reducing the need for direct monitoring (Wright, 
2005).  On the other hand, firms also re-adjust CEO equity incentives toward efficient levels as 
firm characteristics change over time (Core and Guay, 1999).  In summary, the empirical 
evidence suggests that CEO compensation contracts are influenced by the benefits to the firm 
from the specific incentives induced by the contracts, the relative cost of the contract, the 
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prevalence of agency problems and the relative substitutability of monitoring over bonding 
(Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003). 
However, the above literature has focused on the CEO and has paid limited attention to the 
agency problems associated with senior executives below the CEO level.  While the CEO is held 
to be ultimately accountable, in the modern corporation the management function typically rests 
with a senior executive team.11  Accordingly, the issue of how compensation schemes for senior 
executive teams are structured to minimise agency costs is an import topic that requires address.   
 
Agency Theory and Senior Executive Compensation Schemes 
The agency problems arising with respect to the CEO extend’ to the senior executives more 
generally.  Problematically, the agency problems associated with separation of ownership and 
control are further increased by delegation of decision making to various levels of management 
within the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).  The reasons for the existence of delegated 
decision-making in firms provide insight into the agency problems associated with the senior 
executives below the CEO level (Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Christie, Joye and Watts, 2003).  
As people have physical limits to the amount of knowledge storage and information processing 
capacity they are unable to process limitless information efficiently (March and Simon, 1958; 
Simon, 1955; 1959).12  This gives rise to decentralised decision-making because it is not efficient 
to assign all decisions in the firm to the CEO because the CEO lacks the knowledge required and 
                                                 
11 For example, in the failed company HIH, it was ‘common for monument decisions to be made on a collective or 
collegiate basis, or at least after interaction with other managers’ (Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, 
2005)  
12 This concept was developed by Simon (1955, 1959) and March and Simon (1958) and labelled Bounded 
Rationality. Bounded Rationality has been studied in a variety of contexts in both the management and 
psychological literature (Gigerenzer and Selten, 1999).  
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the information processing capacity to make all decisions in the firm efficiently (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1992; Christie, Joye and Watts, 2003). 13    
Efficient delegation of decision-making occurs where decision making is distributed among 
the executives who have the requisite specialist knowledge and incentives to make decisions in 
the interests of shareholders (Christie et al, 2003).  Agency costs arise where executives with 
decision rights make poor decisions because they do not have the requisite knowledge. These 
costs can be reduced by transferring knowledge to the decision makers or by decentralising 
decision rights to those with the requisite knowledge (Christie et al, 2003).  Further agency costs 
arise when those having the specialist knowledge do not exercising those decision rights 
optimally.  The prevalence of agency problems at the level below the CEO induces firms to 
employ bonding and monitoring mechanisms to reduce these agency costs.   
Where decision making is delegated to lower level executives, the ability of the board of 
directors and CEO to effectively monitor those executives is greatly diminished because of 
information asymmetries.  Where monitoring is impaired, the issue of what type of compensation 
scheme that reduces these agency costs is of paramount importance.  Compensation schemes 
may be designed to encourage goal congruence between the senior executives and the CEO or 
between the senior executives and shareholders or generally within the executive team (e.g. 
group compensation scheme) in an effort to reduce agency costs.  Although Jensen and Meckling 
(1992) argue that individual or group compensation schemes may be efficient to minimise these 
agency problems within the firm, as yet the circumstances where these schemes would be 
appropriate for senior executives has not been investigated.14  As it is likely that some firms 
                                                 
13 In an economy wide context, the alienability of ownership and decision rights solves problems associated with a 
centralised economy by means of the price mechanism and capital markets (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). 
14 Individual compensation schemes include: individual performance evaluation schemes (Bushman, Indjejikian and 
Smith, 1996), schemes where the senior executive team members do not have the same performance measures as 
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choose elements of both schemes (Bushman and Smith, 2001), where this study refers to a firm 
having a compensation scheme (group or individual), it is where that compensation scheme is the 
one predominantly relied on for the senior executives. 15 
 
Senior executives compensation where individual effort is observable  
The economics literature (Holmstrom, 1979; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) provides insight 
into the circumstances where individual compensation schemes may be efficient for senior 
executives at the level below the CEO.  Information economics has investigated the conditions 
under which contracting on measures that reflect individual effort (input) is efficient over 
contracting on output alone (Holmstrom, 1979).16  Holmstrom (1979) proposes the 
‘informativeness principle’, in cases where measures of performance provide information about 
executive effort are obtainable efficiently, those performance measures should be included in 
compensation schemes.   
The CEO compensation literature supports the validity of the informativeness principle.  
Separable measures of output are easily identified as the CEO is responsible for the entire entity.  
The question becomes that of the efficiency of different measures of CEO output in capturing 
CEO input (Ittner, Lambert and Larcker, 2003).  For example, the efficiency of accounting 
versus stock price in capturing CEO effort has been investigated (Bushman and Smith, 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                             
each other or tournament incentive schemes (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).  Group compensation schemes exist where 
each executive’s compensation is not independent of compensation for other senior executives.  Included in group 
compensation schemes are: profit sharing schemes or schemes where the senior executive team is paid using 
common performance measures or structures (Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1995; Bushman and Smith, 2001). 
15 See appendix one for an example of this. 
16 In firms characterised by separation of ownership and control, the owners of the firm can diversify their risk by 
holding a portfolio.  Problematically, when firms contract with an agent on output alone, the agent bears 100% of 
the risk and will demand a high payoff to compensate for the extra risk.  It is efficient for firms to design 
compensation schemes that contain other measures of executive effort to reduce the level of compensation tied to 
output alone.  By reducing the level of output related compensation risk, firms reduce the risk premium demanded 
by senior executives (Holmstrom, 1979). 
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However, the efficiency of different performance measures for executives below the CEO is 
problematic due to a lack of separable measures of output.   
When an executive’s output is separable from other executives, individual compensation 
may be efficient because where an individual’s effort (input) and related output of a task are 
separable, they are also observable (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).17  It is efficient for the 
principal to contract on that individual’s output where that output provides information about the 
individual’s effort.  The principal can also contract on the individual’s inputs because there are 
performance measures that are separable to that individual which reflect individual effort.  
Rewards can then distributed to executives who are responsible for the output or based on 
observed input. 
The informativeness principle suggests that individual compensation schemes are more 
appropriate for the senior executives in firms where there are separable measures of output.  This 
is not an issue where the firm is comprised of discrete business units, and decision rights are 
allocated to the business unit executives.  In these firms, decisions are assigned to the executives 
who have the specialised knowledge necessary to manage the discrete business unit and as such 
business unit performance will be informative about the individual executive’s effort (Christie et 
al, 2003).  Individual compensation schemes are efficient for the senior executives in firms with 
discrete business units because business unit performance measures are more informative about 
the senior executive’s effort than aggregate firm performance.18  Accordingly: 
 
                                                 
17 Separable in this context means that the output of an executive’s effort is distinguishable from the output of effort 
by other executives. 
18 This proposition is consistent with findings by Bushman et al (1995) and Keating (1997) who consider individual 
versus aggregate performance evaluation for divisional managers.  This study extends Bushman et al (1995) and 
Keating (1997) by investigating executives above the divisional manager level and by considering firms beyond 
those with a divisional structure only. 
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H1: Firms adopt individual compensation schemes for the senior executives where their 
inputs and outputs are separable and observable. 
 
Senior executives compensation where measures of individual effort are not observable 
However, establishing compensation schemes for integrated firms is problematic, as unlike 
CEOs, measures of performance for individual senior executives are not readily observable.  In 
these circumstances any performance measure is impacted by a number of factors, including cost 
allocations or transfer pricing, and the efforts of other senior executives.  Furthermore, this may 
encourage free riding problems, where executives provide less effort to group tasks, whist 
receiving rewards linked to group performance.   
Insights into the nature of the free riding problem, and its resolution are provided by 
Holmstrom (1979; 1982) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972).  Free riding (shirking) is a problem 
in joint production environments where executives’ efforts (input) are related and output is not 
separable to individual executives.  This circumstance results in a lack of observability of 
individual effort, making pay-performance contracts difficult to specify or enforce.  This reduces 
any positive motivation to increase effort and provides an incentive to shirk because it is difficult 
to detect whether the executive is putting in sufficient effort.  Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and 
Holmstrom (1982) further propose that free riding is a necessary response to firm integration, 
especially in large groups where the shared output relative to each individual’s input effort 
decreases.  Their solution to the free riding problem involves increasing the level of costly 
monitoring and bonding, such as increased management or provision of residual claims on 
ownership.19  
                                                 
19 Offering diluted residual claims also induces agents to shirk, reducing the efficiency of this solution (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) 
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However, there are three reasons why the free riding cost may not necessarily outweigh the 
benefits of group compensation for senior executives’ in integrated firms.  First, group 
compensation schemes provide an incentive for mutual monitoring because each executive’s 
payoffs are related to other executives’ efforts.  If one executive shirks, other executives have an 
incentive and legitimacy to monitor and discipline the free rider in order to increase the value of 
their own compensation claim (Fama and Jensen, 1983).20  Second, the board of directors or the 
CEO can take actions to reduce the free rider problem such as adjusting the size of the senior 
executive team.  Alternatively, the firm could also purchase greater monitoring to detect shirking 
in large executive teams who do have a group compensation scheme.  In support of these 
arguments, the existence of partnerships provides evidence of the efficiency of group 
compensation schemes in some cases (Kendel and Lazear, 1992). 
The third reason why the use of group compensation schemes may not be inefficient in 
integrated firms is because group compensation schemes provide an incentive for executive team 
members to engage in co-operative behaviour to increase group performance because a reward is 
received contingent on satisfying a common goal (Autry, 2005).  Group compensation schemes 
also produce an incentive for executives to increase effort on knowledge sharing and group 
innovation where doing so is likely to increase group performance (Wruck and Jensen, 1994; 
Drake, Haka and Ravenscroft, 1999).21  These incentives have been identified in the management 
                                                 
20 The mutual monitoring of fellow executives may be more efficient than other monitoring mechanisms, contingent 
on the proximity and intimate knowledge of the firm held by senior executives relative to the board of directors and 
shareholders. 
21 Porter (1996) argues that integration efficiencies (synergies) resulting from co-ordinated effort to reduce cost, 
share knowledge and implement strategies are a necessary condition for firms to face competition.  Other writers 
who consider ‘fit’ to be essential to sustainable competitive advantage include Chandler (1962), Miles and Snow 
(1978), Mintzberg (1979), Beer (1980), Nadler and Tushman (1988) and Beer, Voelpel, Leibold and Tekie (2005). 
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and management accounting literature (Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003; Kandel and 
Lazear, 1992; Weiss, 1987).22   
On the other hand, individual compensation schemes provide an incentive for executives to 
act in self interest and expend effort on achieving individual or fractional goals.  The effort 
expended on individual goals rather than common goals is at the expense of effort on 
collaboration and co-ordination (Wruck and Jensen, 1994; Hambrick, 1995; Main, O’Reilly and 
Wade, 1993; Carpenter and Sanders, 2004).23  Further, under an individual compensation 
scheme, executives also have an incentive to inflate the value of their contribution to any joint 
production process whilst minimizing the contribution of others, reducing the observability of 
individual executive efforts.  The incentives induced by a group compensation scheme suggest 
that a group compensation scheme is an alternative to an individual compensation scheme in a 
joint production environment. 
The above discussion suggests that where senior executives’ efforts are related 
(interdependent), group compensation schemes are more efficient than individual compensation 
schemes.  This suggests that in integrated firms, where senior executives’ efforts are 
interdependent and there are benefits to the firm from senior executive team co-operation, group 
                                                 
22 Extant empirical evidence suggests that group compensation is an efficient contracting choice over individual 
compensation schemes in some cases (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Hambrick, 1995; Drake, Haka and Ravenscroft, 
1999; Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003).  Although these studies provide empirical evidence that using group 
compensation is not necessarily inefficient because of the free-rider effect, it is not clear whether the findings from 
these studies are generalizable to senior executive teams.  See appendix two for a brief summary of these studies. 
23 At the level of employees, Drago and Garvey (1997) show that individual compensation schemes lead to a 
decrease in co-operative behaviour.  However they fail to find a positive relation between profit sharing and a 
measure of helping efforts. Further, the budgeting literature identifies a number of agency costs where executives act 
in self interest to achieve individual goals, such as the problems of political game playing (Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2003).  This includes putting slack into the budget among other things.  For example, if a firm is considering 
building a new factory, executives may play political games to have the factory built within their own territory or in 
another’s territory based on the impact on their own performance evaluation.  Under a group compensation scheme, 
executives have an incentive to locate the factory in the most efficient location leading to achievement of group 
performance targets. 
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compensation may reduce some of the agency costs associated with discongruence within the 
senior executive team.  Accordingly:  
 
H2: Firms adopt group compensation schemes for the senior executives the greater the level 
of firm integration.   
 
3 Data and Research Design 
 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
 
The sample is taken from all firms on the S&P All Ordinaries index (Top 500) between 
2003 and 2005 (the preliminary evidence presented in this paper is a subset of these firms where 
data is currently available).  Table one panel A shows the sample selection process.  Financial 
services firms and trusts are excluded because they are subject to different reporting and 
corporate governance requirements.  The distinct economic characteristics of these companies 
may confound statistical tests.  Firms are also excluded where data was not available for 
statistical tests.  Firms with annual reports in foreign currency were also excluded for 
comparability reasons.  The final sample is made up of 640 firm years.  A breakdown of the 
industries for the sample firms is provided in table one panel B.  
 
INSERT TABLE ONE 
 
Executive compensation and corporate governance data is drawn from the UTS – 
Accenture Who Governs Australia database where available and hand collected where necessary 
directly from annual reports.  Financial data was collected from Aspect – Huntly databases.  
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3.2 Research Design 
 
The firm characteristics that are expected to be related to either group or individual 
compensation schemes are analysed first by univariate and then multivariate tests.  For univariate 
testing, the sample is split into two groups.  Univariate tests are used to test whether firm 
characteristics differ on average between the group compensation scheme and individual 
compensation scheme groups.  As normality of distribution is not known, both the t-test and the 
Mann-Whitney U test are used to test for differences in means.  The Levens’s test is used to test 
for differences in variance between the firm characteristics of each group. 
Multivariate tests are used to control for co-linearity between the independent variables.  
Three different left hand side variables are estimated to proxy for the extent to which executives 
receive predominantly group or individual compensation.  As the left hand side proxy is 
categorical, a cross sectional Logit model is used to test for association between firm 
characteristics and compensation scheme (Wright, 2005).  A value of zero is given to firms 
classified as having predominantly an individual compensation scheme and a value of one is 
given to firms classified as having predominantly a group compensation scheme.   
 
3.3 Variable specification 
3.3.1 Defining group and individual compensation schemes 
 
In testing hypothesises, a measure of group and individual compensation schemes is 
needed.  There are inherent problems in classifying different types of compensation schemes 
using publicly available data because annual reports do not consistently disclose the specifics of 
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incentive schemes, only the amounts and categories actually paid.24  As firms do not disclose 
whether they have predominantly a group or individual compensation scheme, it is necessary to 
develop a method to classify the type of compensation scheme used.25  Three methods are 
developed in this study to identify which compensation scheme is predominantly used for the 
senior executives.26  Table two contains a summary of the variables.   
 
Method 1: Variation between executives in compensation level changes 
The first measure involves comparing the relative change in compensation for the senior 
executives between periods.  The percentage change in total compensation is measured for each 
senior executive disclosed, excluding the CEO.  The changes in total compensation for the 
executives are then compared to other members of the executive team to provide a measure of 
the extent to which senior executives’ compensation is related.  Firms with large variation 
between members of the senior executive team indicate dispersed performance evaluation 
                                                 
24 For example, Bridgestone Australia Ltd (BDS, 2004) disclose that for the Specified Executives ‘remuneration 
packages are reviewed with due regard to performance of the individuals and other relevant factors’. Therefore 
individual performance is important in setting executives remuneration, with other factors also considered.  On the 
other hand, Adelaide Brighton Ltd (ABC, 2005) require common performance targets to be met before any short 
term or long term incentive compensation is awarded to the Senior executives.  A Profit Before Tax hurdle must be 
reached for short term incentives to be awarded.  A total shareholder return and / or an earnings per share hurdle 
must be reached for long term compensation to be awarded.  The Annul Report also specifies that ‘participation in 
the LTI arrangements is only offered to the Managing Director and senior executives who are able to influence the 
generation of shareholder wealth and thus have a direct impact on the Group's performance against the relevant 
performance hurdles.’ 
25 For example, Argo Investments Limited discloses that 30% of senior executives’ short term bonus is group 
compensation.  As expected, four out of the top five executives were paid a cash bonus in 2004 and 2005.  Ausmelt 
Limited report that short term bonuses are paid out of a bonus pool established upon achievement of a company 
wide performance target.  The pool is distributed based upon individual performance evaluation.  No executives 
received a cash bonus or were granted options in 2005.  
26 Extant literature does not provide a publicly available empirical proxy for group types of compensation schemes.  
Keating (1997) used a survey to collect division managers perceptions on the extent to which various performance 
measures were used by their supervisors to evaluate their performance.  Bushman et al (1995) uses proprietary 
survey data obtained from Hewitt Associates LLC.  Bushman et al (1995) unit of analysis is individual Group CEO, 
Division CEO or Plant managers and uses their perception of the average proportion of above level and at their level 
information used to evaluate the average manager at their level.  Drake et al (1999) us a self constructed profit share 
scheme versus individual piece rate scheme in there experiment.  Hamilton et al (2003) case company uses a group 
output piece rate versus and individual piece rate scheme.  Despite the lack of a publicly available empirical proxy 
for a general group or individual compensation scheme, it is possible to ex post asses the variation between senior 
executives compensation from annual report disclosures. 
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structures; firms with smaller percentage changes between members are evidence of closer 
performance evaluation structures.  Closer performance evaluation structures are consistent with 
groups of executives being remunerated on common performance measures (group compensation 
scheme).  Divergent performance evaluation structures are consistent with executives being 
rewarded under an individual, rather than group compensation schemes. 
 Firms are ranked in terms of variation between the executives in total compensation 
changes.  Group versus individual compensation scheme companies are estimated by splitting 
the sample at the median, with the fifty percent with the least (greatest) variation between 
executives labelled as group (individual) compensation scheme firms.  To reduce the inherent 
error in estimating compensation scheme type, hypothesis tests are also conducted excluding the 
middle thirty three percent of firms. 
 
Method 2: Common compensation structure  
Firms are considered as having predominantly a group compensation scheme in place 
where the majority of executives, excluding the CEO, receive the same compensation type (cash 
bonus and / or equity / long term compensation).  As most firms disclose compensation details 
for at least four senior executives, a group compensation scheme is considered to be where at 
least 75% of the total number disclosed receive the same type of compensation payments (further 
75% is the median level of variation).  This allow for the case where an executive is not covered 
by the group compensation scheme for part of the year.  The individual compensation scheme 
group is classified where less than 75% of executive receive the same compensation type.  A 
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value of zero is assigned to firms with an individual compensation scheme and a value of one is 
assigned to the firms with predominantly a group compensation scheme.27   
 
Method 3: Variation in incentive compensation level 
The third measure involves comparing the percentage of total incentive compensation 
(cash bonus and / or equity / long term compensation) relative to base pay between senior 
executives.  As with Method one, the greater the similarity between executives, the more (less) 
likely there is a group (individual) compensations scheme.  Sensitivity testing using the relative 
proportion of different components of incentive compensation (short term versus long term 
components) is conducted to increase the robustness of results. 
Firms are ranked in terms of the variation between executives relative proportion of 
incentive compensation to base pay.  Group versus individual compensation scheme companies 
are estimated by splitting the sample at the median, with the fifty percent with the least (greatest) 
variation between executives labelled as group (individual) compensation scheme firms.  To 
reduce the inherent error in estimating compensation scheme type, hypothesis tests are also 
conducted excluding the middle thirty three percent of firms. 
 
INSERT TABLE TWO 
                                                 
27 To increase the validity of this proxy, sensitivity test are performed where the cut-off for the individual 
compensation scheme is 63 instead of 75% and the group compensation scheme cut-off is maintained at 75%.  In 
this sensitivity test the 63 to 75% group is excluded. 
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3.3.2 Experimental variables 
 
As discussed in section two, there are a number of characteristics of the firm that are 
likely to determine in which cases a group or an individual compensation scheme is more 
appropriate.  Direct tests of hypothesis one and two are related to the extent that the separability 
and observability of senior executives’ inputs and outputs is associated with the level of firm 
integration.  This is because the concept of group versus individual compensation is a dichotomy.  
Proxies developed to test each hypothesis differ to allow for identification of the different factors 
associated with the choice of compensation scheme.  The separability and observability of senior 
executives’ inputs and outputs is estimated using the level of industry and geographic 
segmentation.  The level of firm integration is estimated using segment interdependencies, level 
of capital expenditure and functional senior executive team structure.  The following section 
develops these firm characteristics and specifies empirical proxies.  Table three contains a 
summary of the firm characteristics and the predicted signs. 
 
Hypothesis one: Independent variables 
Industry and geographic segmentation 
Firms that pursue a diversification strategy by entering a variety of industries need senior 
executives who specialize in those industries.  Further, firms that diversify into different 
geographic segments, such as multinational firms, also need executives with specialized 
knowledge of the different segments.  The effort exerted by the specialist executives is directed 
toward the industry or geographic segment they specialize in and the output of those executives 
is separable to that segment (relative to executives who contribute to multiple segments). 
Therefore, applying the Holmstrom (1979) informativeness principle and Alchian and Demsetz 
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(1972) separability of input and output proposition, it is efficient to compensate the senior 
executives of diversified firms using individual compensation to the extent that individual 
executive’s input to each segment can be separated.28  There are two studies that do consider the 
relation between firm diversification strategy and compensation structure at the divisional 
manager level (Bushman et al, 1995; Keating, 1997).  Although these studies are consistent with 
the theory development above, they do not address senior executive compensation at the level 
just below the CEO.  Further, both these studies are limited to a sample of multi divisional firm, 
which reduces the generalizability of results. 
Australian publicly listed firms are required to make detailed geographic and industry 
segment disclosures, based upon the internal reporting used by the firm.29  Thus segment 
reporting reflects how the company is organised and managed.  The reporting of segments that 
differ in terms of risk and rewards (AASB 1005) allows insight into the extent of a firm’s 
diversification strategy.  The method adopted in this study to proxy for the level of industry and 
geographic diversification is the number of industry or geographic segments disclosed.  The log 
of the number of segments is used as it provides a closer match with a normal distribution so as 
not to violate regression assumptions.  
 
                                                 
28 For example, a mining firm who diversifies into information technology would need among the senior executives 
some who are experts in mining and some who are experts in technology.  The experts in mining would be 
compensated predominantly on the performance of the mining segment.  It would be counterintuitive to pay the 
experts in mining on the performance of the information technology segment.  On the other hand, an Australian firm 
who diversifies to Japan would need senior executive decision makers who know the Japanese market and who can 
make judgments about risks and returns to the investment.  They would also need to know Japanese customs and 
culture to adequately assess the divisional, plant and other managers in the Japanese segment.  It would be efficient 
to contract with the senior executive team member who specialised in Japanese business, based upon the 
performance of the Japanese segment. 
29 According to AASB 1005 (2003) the preparation of segment disclosures first involves ‘identifying business and 
geographical segments based on internally reported information’ and secondly determining the materiality of those 
segment (Eddy, Arthur and Knapp, 2001). 
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Hypothesis two: Independent variables 
Segment interdependencies 
Many firms that have separate industry and geographic segments also have segment 
interdependencies (Bushman et al, 1995).  Segment interdependencies arise where the business 
segments are related, allowing for synergies such as transfer of knowledge and resources 
between segments.  Further, as the level of interdependencies increases, the level of separability 
of effort (input) and output of those responsible for managing the segments decreases (Bushmen 
et al, 1995).30  Also, under a group compensation scheme, executives have an incentive to realise 
and extend inter-segment synergies.  On the other hand, under an individual compensation 
scheme, executives have an incentive to limit effort spill-over’s and exert less effort toward co-
operation with other segment executives.  Furthermore, as interdependencies increase, the 
separability of segment performance to individual executives decreases, reducing the precision of 
individual performance evaluation.  Therefore, the greater the interdependencies between 
business segments, the more efficient group compensation schemes are relative to individual 
compensation schemes for the senior executives.   
Two measures of interdependence between segments are used in this study; the 
percentage of inter-segment assets eliminated on consolidation and the proportion of assets 
allocated to a central management function. 
 
                                                 
30 Keating (1997) and Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith (1995) find a positive association between the level of 
weight placed on group relative to individual compensation for division managers and interdependence between 
divisions.  Both of these studies are limited in their generalizability because they both focus on firms organized 
around divisions.  Bushman et al (1995) and Keating (1997) is also limited to divisional manager compensation, 
limiting the generalizability to senior executives.  This study extends Bushman et al (1995) and Keating (1997) in 
two main ways.  First, this study increased the generalizablilty and importance of their findings by placing the 
contracting problem of manger interdependencies in the broader context of senior executives.  This study also 
increases the generalizabilty of their results by studying a wider range of firms by addressing firms beyond those 
with division structure only.  Secondly, this study draws on a broader theory base in developing predictions allowing 
predictions about factors beyond inter-segment sales between divisions. 
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Percentage of inter-segment assets 
A proxy for interdependence between industry segments is the proportion of inter-
segment asset eliminated on consolidation to total assets.  This proxy is consistent with Bushman 
et al (1995) who used the level of inter-segment sales eliminated on consolidation as a proxy for 
intra-segment interdependencies in their study of divisional managers.  Although elimination 
assets are used in this study because of transfer pricing issues associated with elimination sales, 
elimination sales are replicated in the sensitivity analysis.  The larger of industry or geographic 
inter-segment asset eliminations is used as the firm level of inter-segment interdependence.   
 
Proportion of assets allocated to a central management function 
Another measure of inter-segment integration is the size of a firms central management 
function (head office).  The logic behind this measure is that where a firm has a co-ordination 
mechanism such as a head office, it indicates there is a need for integration across departments or 
divisions.  The size of a firm’s central management function is measured as the proportion of 
assets specifically allocated to a central management function (head office) to total assets in the 
annual report primary segment disclosure note.   
Where a firm has assets allocated to individual geographic and industry segments, then 
the firm separates input and output based on segment performance.  In cases where assets are 
allocated to the central management function, separability of input and output diminishes as 
senior executives become involved across several industry segments.  As the level of assets 
allocated to the central management function increases, there would be increasing difficulty in 
separating the contribution to input and related output of individual senior executives, making 
group compensation efficient relative to individual compensation schemes. 
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Level of capital expenditure 
There are two reasons why group compensation schemes are efficient for firms with large 
capital expenditures.  First, larger capital budgeting decisions are likely to benefit from increased 
co-operation and information sharing between senior executives during the decision-making 
stage.  This is because large capital expenditures are an indication that important decisions, 
essential to the firm’s competitive advantage and subsequent performance have been made, 
suggesting increased senior executive team involvement (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996).  
Capital investment decisions often involve non-routine decisions requiring increased information 
sharing between decision makers (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996) and a need for co-ordinated 
effort in evaluating the available investment opportunity set.31  Therefore, a compensation 
scheme that encourages increased information sharing and co-ordination between senior 
executives may be efficient.  Group compensation schemes are more likely to be appropriate 
where the senior executive teams are involved in making large capital budgeting decisions that 
are going to impact overall firm performance because of the greater agency costs of suboptimal 
decision making.32  
The second reason group compensation is likely to be efficient for firm’s with large 
capital investment is because of a need for integration between individual executives in the 
implementation stage.  The implementation of large capital investments is likely to increase 
senior executives’ interdependencies through increased co-ordination needs throughout the firm.  
                                                 
31 For example, Chalos and Poon (2000) in a survey of 55 capital budgeting teams found that capital budgeting 
‘team performance improved significantly as information sharing increased’.  Unfortunately this study did not 
specifically investigate senior executive teams. 
32 It is also likely that use of group compensation over individual compensation schemes may reduce some of the 
dysfunctional behaviour and inefficient decision making associated with capital budgeting decisions as identified in 
the capital budgeting literature (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). 
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This is because capital expenditures require vertical co-ordination along the supply chain as new 
technologies and processes are integrated (Fry, 1982; Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Thompson, 
1967).  The need to integrate large capital investments increases the importance of co-operation 
in sharing knowledge, resources and skills between the senior executive team and different parts 
of the organization (Wood, 1986; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996).  These factors suggest that 
group compensation schemes will be efficient the greater the level of capital expenditure because 
of the need for integration and the positive benefits to the firm from increased co-operation 
between senior executives.33   
 The measure used to approximate the level of CAPEX is the change in total assets 
divided by total assets (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996).   
It is important to note that the overall level of integration of senor executive effort 
demanded by large capital investments will be heavily influenced by level of firm diversification.  
Where a firm is involved in only one industry segment, there is likely to be a greater demand for 
integration within the senior executive team relative to the case where the same level of 
investment is separable to several unrelated industry segments.  Consistent with this, CAPEX is 
interacted with INDSEG to assess whether increasing industry diversification dilutes the 
efficiency of group compensation schemes for firms with large CAPEX. 
 
Functional structure 
Firms that are organised around a functional structure, rather than divisional, are more likely 
to have joint decision making within the senior executive team.  Where firms are organised 
                                                 
33 For example, during a capital budgeting meeting involving integrated decision making, one executive may come 
up with a suggestion for a strategic acquisition, another executive may provide the technical knowledge to plan the 
strategy, another executive provides market knowledge and another executive may provides technical knowledge.  
The output of the new strategy is reflected in total firm performance.  The overall output of the management process 
in this case is not separable, despite the inputs being somewhat observable.   
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around functional lines there is a need for the executives to share knowledge necessary for 
efficient decision making.  Much knowledge and firm specific technology such as market trends, 
innovations in production and distribution and forecast data is distributed among different 
functional divisions.  Members of the senior executive team will benefit from joint decision 
making where functional executives contribute their specialized knowledge.  If using group 
compensation increases the effectiveness of integrated decision making through increased 
incentives to cooperate, then group compensation schemes will be efficient for firms organised 
around a functional organisational structure.  On the other hand, individual compensation 
schemes provide incentives for rational senior executives to contribute to joint decision only to 
the extent that is necessary to satisfy the individual compensation scheme. 
The measure used to estimate functional structure is based on the proportion of functional 
senior executives disclosed in the annual report.  The variable is calculated as number of senior 
executives whose title disclosed in the annual report identifies them as functional manager, 
divided by total executives.  For example, if a company has a CFO, CIO, Marketing executive 
and two executives of discrete business units, the variable would be 60%. This is because the 
CFO and CIO and Marketing managers are generally heads of large functional departments such 
as finance, information technology or marketing. 
 
INSERT TABLE THREE 
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3.3.3 Control Variables 
 
There are a number of other factors that may explain variation in compensation scheme 
choice that may be co-related with the independent variables.  These control factors are included 
in the multivariate tests.   
 
Firm size 
As a firm’s internal structure becomes more complicated, there is likely a change in 
management structure.  However larger firms also have other properties that extend beyond firm 
complexity, making it a noisy measure.  For example, firm size has been used as a proxy for 
political costs, growth and investment opportunities and difficulty in direct monitoring by the 
board of directors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Smith and Watts, 
1992; Eaton and Rosen, 1983; Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1996).  Firm size is measured as 
the natural log of market capitalization. 
 
Industry 
Industry is associated with variation in compensation structure (Murphy, 1999).  It is 
expected that because different industries have different economic characteristics there will be a 
relation between industry type and executive compensation scheme.  Industry dummies are used 
to capture industry variation.   
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3.3.4 Model specification and summary 
 
Equation one specifies the model and control variables.  As the purpose of this model is 
to test the association between compensation contract choice and firm characteristics, unless 
specified in the model, RHS variables for are taken from the previous year.   
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   1 
 
GEOSEG = Level of geographic diversification is the Log of the sum of the number of 
geographic segments disclosed in the notes to the annual report.  
INDSEG = Level of industry diversification is measured using the same method as GEOSEG 
using the industry segment disclosure.  
INTAS = Interdependencies related to inter-segment sharing or transfer of assets is 
measured using the greater of geographic or industry segment assets eliminated 
on consolidation.  The measure is the log of the proportion of inter-segment assets 
to total assets. 
HOASSET = Interdependencies related to centralised management structure is measured using 
the proportion of assets specifically allocated to a central management function 
(head office) in the primary segment disclosure to total assets.  
CAPEX = Level of capital expenditure is measured by dividing the change in total assets by 
opening total assets. 
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FUNCST =  Functional Structure is measured by the number of functional executives on the 
executive team divided by total senior executives.  Functional executives are 
those where the annual report identifies them as having functional responsibility 
such as being responsible for functional departments such as marketing, finance 
or research and development.  Functional executives do not include divisional 
executive who are in charge of integrated business units. 
SIZE = Firm Size is measured using the log of market capitalization 
INDUSTRY = Dummy variable for each industry 
YEAR = Dummy variable for each year 
 
4 Results and discussion 
 
The following results are preliminary and are limited to firm years where data availability 
permits.  As such, the following section is limited in generalizability so should be interpreted 
with caution. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Tables four and five panel A reveals that the sample size for these preliminary statistics is 
reduced by limited data availability.34  As this study is incomplete, data collection and 
transformation is not complete, limiting the preliminary results here reported.  For example, 
compensation to enable estimation of compensation scheme using method two is limited to 
520firm years and data on the number of industry segments is collected for 610 firm years, 
whereas the functional structure variable is only available for 150 firm years at this stage.  Panel 
                                                 
34 Data for the complete sample will be collected and analyzed as part of this research project. 
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B shows that the sample firms are from a range different industries with the largest 
representation from industrials firms, making up 37.7% of the sample firm years.  Data has been 
Winsorised to reduce the influence of outliers on reported results. 
Analysis of the dependent variables reveals that although each of the three methods are 
correlated, there are differences.  To reduce the inherent imprecision in method one and three, 
the middle thirty three percent of observations have been removed for correlation analysis.  All 
methods are positively correlated, although the level of correlation in method two is relatively 
low (see table five panel c).  This is consistent with there being different factors influencing the 
setting of compensation structure as apposed to setting compensation levels (Wright, 2005).  The 
level of correlation between method one and three is higher, the data also suggests that different 
factors influence the setting of total compensation as apposed to the level of incentive 
compensation.  Although these are interesting empirical findings, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to investigate the different factors contributing to the variation between the three methods.   
Although the correlations in table five panel B are generally consistent with the theory 
development, there is a surprising result.  The existence of a group compensation scheme 
(method two) is positively associated with firm size (0.171, p. <.001), and level of inter-segment 
assets (0.112, p. <0.10).  Contrary to expectations, group compensation schemes are also 
positively related to the level of industry diversification (0.75, p. <0.10).   
The level of diversification (both industry and geographic) is negatively associated with 
the level of capital expenditure (-0.082, p. <001 and -0.145, p. <05 respectively).  GEOSEG is 
negatively associated with FUNCST (-.284, p. 0.001) and positively associated with INDSEG 
(0.174, p. <0.001).  INTAS is negatively associated with GEOSEG (-0.132, p. <0.05) but 
positively associated with INDSEG (0.274, p. <0.001).  The existence of multiple correlations 
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between the independent variable may introduce a multicollinearity problem.35  Although these 
correlations will bias against finding a result, collinearly diagnostics show that the VIF factor is 
less than 1.58 for all variables in model one (using OLS), suggesting that although collinearity is 
present, the level of collinearity is not likely to disturb the direction of coefficients in a 
regression estimation model. 
 
INSERT TABLE FOUR 
 
INSERT TABLE FIVE 
 
4.2 Univariate tests 
Univariate test do support hypothesis one where group versus individual compensation is 
estimated using method one and three (see table six).  However hypothesis one is not supported 
using method two.  As reported in table six panel A and C, for method one and three, industry is 
significantly higher for firms identified as having predominantly an individual compensation 
scheme.  However, the level of geographic segmentation is only significantly higher for 
individual compensation scheme firms when measured using method two.  Where compensation 
scheme choice is estimated using method two, both industry and geographic segmentation is 
lower for firms identified as having predominantly an individual compensation scheme.  
Although the geographic segmentation mean is not significantly different, the variance is at the 
10% level.  The level of industry diversification is significantly lower in both parametric and non 
parametric tests.   
                                                 
35 As all correlations are below 0.8, it is unlikely that the multicollinearity bias is material (Hinton, Brownlow, 
McMurray and Cozens, 2004,  p. 323) 
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Univariate tests are supportive of hypothesis two.  The mean level of CAPEX, INTAS, 
HOASSET and FUNCST are all greater for group compensation scheme companies, as 
predicted.  With the exception of FUNCST, they are significantly different, either in variance or 
mean values (albeit at the 10% level for CAPEX and HOASSET).  However FUNCST is not 
significantly different in any of the univariate tests.  To the extent that CAPEX, INTAS, 
HOASSET capture the separability of senior executive input output, they provide indirect 
evidence in support of hypothesis one. 
 
INSERT TABLE SIX 
 
4.3 Multivariate tests 
These results need to be considered with caution as the sample size is reduced considerably 
because data for the full sample has not been collected (n. of 91).  As the industry dummies are 
not significant in any of the regressions, results are not reported. 
Method one has been used to estimate the left hand side variable for all models in table 
seven panel A.  All models are significant (Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test greater 
than 0.05) and have explanatory power (Nagelkerke R Square between 0.111 and 0.531).  
Consistent with univariate tests, table seven panel A provides evidence in support for both 
hypothesis one and two as that INDSEG and FUNCST are consistently significant and in the 
predicted direction.  However, GEOSEG, INTAS, HOASSET and CAPEX are not significant or 
in the direction predicted. 
Method two has been used to estimate the left hand side variable for all models in table 
seven panel B.  All models are significant (Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test greater 
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than 0.05) and have explanatory power (Nagelkerke R Square between 0.136 and 0.389).  
Consistent with univariate tests, preliminary results from multivariate tests do not support 
hypothesis one.  The level of industry and geographic segmentation is consistently in the 
opposite direction to that predicted.  It is also significant at the 10% level (two tailed) in model 
two when the interaction between INDSEG and CAPEX is controlled for.  Preliminary 
multivariate tests do provide support for hypothesis two.  INTAS, HOASSET and CAPEX are all 
in the predicted direction and consistently significant in at least three out of the four Logit 
regressions.  The reason CAPEX is not significant in model one may be because of the sample 
size reducing the power of the test and because the interaction between INDSEG and CAPEX 
was not controlled for.  As with the univariate tests, FUNCST is not significant in any models.  
Also, to the extent that CAPEX, INTAS, HOASSET capture the separability of senior executive 
input output, they provide indirect evidence in support of hypothesis one. 
Method three has been used to estimate the left hand side variable for all models in table 
seven panel C.  All models are significant (Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test greater 
than 0.05) and have explanatory power (Nagelkerke R Square between 0.095 and 0.571).  
Consistent with univariate tests and method one, table seven panel A provides evidence in 
support for both hypothesis one and two as INDSEG and FUNCST are consistently significant 
and in the predicted direction.  However, GEOSEG, INTAS, HOASSET and CAPEX are not 
significant or in the direction predicted. 
 
INSERT TABLE SEVEN 
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These preliminary findings suggests that it is the potential for synergies between senior 
executives in integrated firms, rather than the observability of senior executive inputs and output 
as captured by the level of industry and geographic diversification or FUNCST, that is the 
determining factor in whether firms chose individual or group compensation schemes for the 
senior executives. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
As the model developed includes variables that have been untested in the context of the 
hypothesises, a number of different specifications are developed to increase the robustness of the 
results.  Because this study is incomplete, sensitivity analysis is specified but not reported.  The 
classification of group versus individual compensation scheme groups is subject to sensitivity.  
Hypothesises are retested using different specification of the cut off for identifying group and 
individual compensation scheme firms for all methods.  For example, for Method two, 63% as 
apposed to 75% commonality is used to differentiate those firms who use predominantly group 
or individual compensation schemes.  Further, the sample is also split into three groups and the 
firm characteristics are compared excluding the middle group, where it is difficult to determine 
the compensation scheme in place. 
Alternative specifications for the right hand side variables are outlined below and in tables 
eight and nine. 
 
Industry and Geographic segmentation 
A Herfindahl index of diversification is used as an alternative method to the sum of the 
number of segments disclosed.  The Herfindahl index of diversification is calculated by taking 
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the sum of the square of the proportion of each of the segment sales.  The sum of squares is 
divided by total firm sales (Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith, 2004).  This index may provide a 
more comprehensive measure of diversification than a simple count.  A Herfindahl index is 
calculated for both industry and geographic segmentation.   
 
Segment interdependencies: Percentage of inter-segment sales 
An alternative proxy for interdependence between industry and geographic segments is 
the proportion of inter-segment sales to total sales.  The larger of industry or geographic inter-
segment sales is used as the firm level of inter-segment interdependence.  The level of inter-
segment sales was also used by Bushman et al (1995) as a proxy for intra-segment 
interdependencies in their study of divisional managers.  The reason that inter-segment asset 
eliminations are used as the primary variable in this study is because the effect of transfer pricing 
on inter-segment sales is unclear.  
 
Level of capital expenditure 
The average of three years of CAPEX is included in tests of hypothesises to differentiate 
between firms who make large one-off capital investments and firms who regularly make large 
CAPEX.  Further sensitivity testing includes using net capital expended on property plant and 
equipment from the cash flow statement instead of CAPEX. 
 
INSERT TABLE EIGHT 
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Executive share ownership  
Where the CEO and other top executives own a large parcel of shares, their interests are 
aligned to shareholders (Ittner, Lambert and Larcker, 2003), reducing the need for incentive 
compensation.  The number of shares that the entire executive team, excluding CEO, multiplied 
by the share price at the end of the financial year is used as a proxy for the relative incentive 
level of executive team share ownership.  A separate variable is used for CEO share ownership is 
specified in table nine. 
 
INSERT TABLE NINE 
 
Further sensitivity testing will be carried out to control for multi-collinearity between the 
level of segmentation, firm size and compensation scheme choice.  The Logit model is retested 
using maximum likelihood estimation.  Also, firms where it is difficult to determine the 
compensation scheme type are included in an ordered Logit regression.    
 
5 Conclusion and limitations 
 
As the reported results are limited to a restricted sample where limited data is currently 
available, results are to be interpreted with caution. 
The empirical evidence presented provides mixed evidence in support of hypothesis one. 
Where compensation scheme type is estimated using method one and three, firms that choose 
individual compensation have a greater level of industry diversification, consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms adopt individual compensation schemes for the senior executives where 
their inputs and outputs are separable and observable.  However, this is not the case for firms 
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with increased geographic diversification or where method two is used to estimate compensation 
scheme type. 
Both univariate and multivariate tests provide support for hypothesis two, however there is 
an empirical difference between how firms set compensation levels (change in total 
compensation and relative level of incentive pay) as apposed to structure (short versus long term 
compensation) with reference to industry diversification.  Where method two is use to estimate 
compensation scheme choice, univariate and multivariate tests provide support for hypothesis 
two in terms of capital expenditure, inter-segment assets, existence of a head office.  However, in 
the case of the level of functional structure, no support is offered.  When compensation scheme 
choice is estimated using method one and three, only the level of functional structure is 
associated with the choice of group compensation schemes.   
These preliminary findings suggests that it is the potential for synergies between senior 
executives in integrated firms, rather than the observability of senior executive inputs and output 
as captured by the level of industry and geographic diversification that is the determining factor 
in whether firms choose individual or group compensation schemes with reference to the level of 
commonality in compensation structure (method two) for the senior executives.  However when 
firms set the level of commonality between senior executive incentive bonus level (method 
three) and change in total compensation (method one) it is the level of industry diversification 
and functional structure that are the determining factors. 
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6 Future research 
 
The following topics are questions raised from the above study. 
 
6.1 Mutual monitoring as a governance mechanism 
It is expected that use of group compensation schemes relative to individual compensation 
schemes is increasing as difficulty in direct monitoring increases.  Difficulty in direct monitoring 
of executives is proposed to be related to the information asymmetry between the board and 
executives, reducing the ability of the board to effectively contract with executives (Bushman 
and Smith, 2001) and increasing in the potential for adverse selection risk.  The difficulty in 
monitoring executives is increasing in the complexity of the firm, decreasing quality of 
performance measurement measures such as accounting numbers and increasing growth options 
(Bushman and Smith, 2001; Core and Guay, 2001; Ittner, Lambert and Larcker, 2003).  Where 
the board of directors have difficulty in observing effort, to reduce shirking, they can either 
increase the monitoring mechanisms like purchasing more auditing, or increase bonding 
mechanisms such as awarding equity, both of which are costly.  On the other hand, by 
introducing a group compensation scheme, directors provide an incentive for executives to 
monitor the effort levels of other executives because the attainment of common performance 
targets is related to the sum of effort by all executives.  Group compensation schemes may be 
used as a substitute for direct monitoring by the board through increasing mutual monitoring by 
the executive team who are in a better position than the board to monitor effort and output 
because of the information asymmetry.  Effort expended by executives engaging in mutual 
monitoring and peer pressure incurs costs to the firm.   
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6.2 Accounting verse other performance measures in group compensation 
schemes 
 
Research into the efficiency of accounting and other performance measures in group or 
individual compensation schemes for senior executives would be consistent with the CEO 
compensation literature and a natural extension of this study. 
 
6.3 Different contexts in the relation between firm characteristics and 
individual and group compensation schemes  
 
The model developed in the study could be replicated at the divisional manager level to 
allow greater comparability with earlier literature like Bushman et al (1995) and Keating (1997). 
 
6.4 Alternative specification of variables  
The model developed in the study could be replicated and extended though different 
approaches.  For example, survey research may uncover nuances in the predicted relations and 
suggest further proxies for replication and refinement of the model.  
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Table 1: Sample characteristics 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Index 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Index 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Population 493 496 485 1474 
Financial Services 
Firm 
107 114 113 334 
Missing Annual 
Report data / 
Trusts / Annual 
Report in Foreign 
Currency   
199 178 123 500 
Sample firms 187 204 249 640 
 
Panel B: Industry representation a 
Industry 
  
Percentage 
of sample 
Energy 5.6% 
Materials 27.3% 
Industrials 37.7% 
Consumer Staples 8.1% 
Health Care 10.0% 
Information Technology 7.3% 
Telecommunications Services 2.2% 
Utilities 1.7% 
a Based on 640firm years. 
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Table 2: Group versus Individual compensation scheme proxies 
Variable Description 
Method 1: Variation 
between executives in 
compensation level 
changes 
The total level of compensation paid to each executive is 
calculated for each year.  The percentage change in total 
compensation between years for each executive is then 
calculated.  A measure of variation between the senior 
executive team is calculated (standard deviation).  Firms are 
ranked according to the level of variation between executives 
and split at the median.  Firms with the least (greatest) 
variation between executives are classified as having a group 
(individual) compensation scheme. 
Method 2: Common 
compensation structure 
(short term cash bonus 
and / or equity / long 
term compensation)36 
Firms are classified as having predominantly a group 
compensation scheme where at least 75% of the senior 
executives receive the same compensation type (short term 
cash bonus and / or long term compensation / equity). 
All other firms where executives do not receive the same 
compensation type (short term cash bonus and / or long term 
compensation / equity) are classified as having predominantly 
an individual compensation scheme. 
Method 3:Variation in 
incentive compensation 
level 
The relative percentage of incentive compensation (short term 
cash bonus and long term compensation / equity). to base pay 
is calculated.  A measure of variation between the senior 
executive team is calculated (standard deviation).  Firms are 
ranked according to the level of variation between executives 
and split at the median.  Firms with the least (greatest) 
variation between executives are classified as having a group 
(individual) compensation scheme.  
 
 
                                                 
36 Table four contains preliminary findings on whether sufficient variability is observed in practice to allow the 
above classification to work.  The preliminary results show 46% of firms had a group compensation scheme and 
42% had individual compensation schemes.  12% of firms paid no bonus or equity compensation during the year.   
 
 44
Table 3: Firm characteristics that are expected to determine when using a group 
compensation scheme is more efficient than an individual compensation scheme for senior 
executives. 
Variable Variable Name Proxy Used Predicted sign  
(+ is group and –
individual compensation 
scheme) 
Geographic 
segmentation 
GEOSEG  Natural log of the sum of the number of geographic 
segments disclosed in the notes to the annual report.  
- 
Industry 
segmentation 
INDSEG Natural log of the sum of the number of industry 
segments disclosed in the notes to the annual report. 
- 
Inter-segment 
Interdependencies: 
Geographic and 
Industry Segment 
interdependence 
INTAS  The proportion of inter-segment assets to total assets in 
the segment disclosure note.  The larger of geographic 
or industry inter-segment assets. 
+ 
CAPEX 
expenditure one 
year 
CAPEX Change in total assets divided by opening total assets.  + 
Inter-segment 
Interdependencies: 
Proportion of 
assets allocated to 
the central 
management 
function 
HOASSET  The proportion of assets specifically allocated to a 
central management function (head office) to total 
assets in the primary segment disclosure. 
+ 
Functional 
Structure 
FUNCST Number of functional executives on the executive team 
divided by total senior executives.  Functional 
executives are those who are in charge of functional 
departments such as marketing, finance or research and 
development or generalist managers.  Functional 
executives do not include divisional executive who are 
in charge of integrated business units. 
+ 
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Table 4: Percentage firms using predominantly group versus individual compensation 
schemes for the senior executives a   
 Number of 
firm years 
Percentage 
of sample 
Group compensation scheme 
Over 75% of executives receive the same 
compensation structure (short term cash bonus and / or 
long term compensation / equity). 
270 45.5% 
Individual compensation scheme 
At least one executive receive bonus or equity but less 
than 75% of executive received a common 
compensation structure (short term cash bonus and / or 
long term compensation / equity). 
250 42.2% 
No executive received a short term cash bonus and / or 
long term compensation / equity. 
73 12.3% 
Total 593 100% 
a The sample is based on 640 firm years, however there are 47 firm years excluded where details of less than 3 
executives are disclosed. SCHEME (Method 2) is where at least 75% of the top senior executives receive the 
same type of compensation payments, being either short term cash bonus and / or long term compensation / equity 
(Method 2).  All other firm years are classified as having an individual compensation scheme, where less than 
75% of the senior executives receive the same type of compensation payments, being either short term cash bonus 
and / or long term compensation / equity (Method 2).37   
 
 
                                                 
37 To test whether there is a relation between compensation type over time, the compensation types of executives 
was compared with their type in 2002.  Using available data on 62 firms, the proportion of executives receiving a 
certain compensation type in 2002 is significantly correlated with the same compensation type in 2004 at the 0.01 
level (.531using a Spearman’s Correlation). 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlation table a 
Panel A – Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Panel B – Correlation table dependent variables  c  
   
SCHEME 
(Method3) SIZE CAPEX GEOSEG INDSEG INTAS HOASSET FUNCST 
SCHEME Correlation 1.000 0.171 0.064 0.010 0.075 0.112 0.044 0.067 
(Method3) p-value (2-tailed)  0.000* 0.147 0.818 0.095** 0.061** 0.463 0.454
 N 520 508 516 491 495 279 279 127
SIZE Correlation 0.181 1.000 -0.013 0.195 0.365 0.137 0.014 -0.071
 p-value (2-tailed)) 0.000* 0.746 0.000* 0.000* 0.014* 0.808 0.396
 N 508 623 622 590 594 322 322 144
CAPEX Correlation 0.055 0.012 1.000 -0.145 -0.082 0.076 0.003 -0.029
 p-value (2-tailed) 0.212 0.768 0.000* 0.044* 0.169 0.956 0.722
 N 516 622 636 602 606 329 329 149
GEOSEG Correlation 0.017 0.194 -0.137 1.000 0.174 -0.132 -0.008 -0.284
 p-value (2-tailed) 0.706 0.000* 0.001* 0.000* 0.016* 0.882 0.000*
 N 491 590 602 606 603 329 329 147
INDSEG Correlation 0.075 0.345 -0.066 0.166 1.000 0.274 0.003 -0.082
 p-value (2-tailed) 0.097** 0.000* 0.106 0.000* 0.000* 0.963 0.322
 N 495 594 606 603 610 328 328 149
INTAS Correlation 0.098 0.142 0.053 -0.102 0.275 1.000 0.040 0.049
 p-value (2-tailed) 0.101** 0.011* 0.334 0.065** 0.000*  0.469 0.611
 N 279 322 329 329 328 333 333 111
HOASSET Correlation 0.076 0.098 -0.035 0.074 -0.056 -0.069 1.000 0.096
 p-value (2-tailed) 0.204 0.080* 0.527 0.179 0.311 0.208  0.317
 N 279 322 329 329 328 333 333 111
FUNCST Correlation 0.088 -0.038 0.019 -0.254 -0.013 0.031 -0.001 1.000
 p-value (2-tailed) 0.327 0.649 0.818 0.002* 0.874 0.748 0.990
 N 127 144 149 147 149 111 111 150
 
      Percentiles  
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Median Minimum 25th 75th Maximum 
GEOSEGb 606 2.34 1.40 2 1 1 3 6 
INDSEGb 610 2.36 1.50 2 1 1 3 6 
CAPEX 636 13.2% 28.0% 7.9% -46.5% -2.8% 26.8% 71.7% 
INTAS 333 0.009 0.015 0 0 0 0.017 0.036 
HOASSET 333 0.018 0.098 0 0 0 0 1.033 
FUNCST 150 0.45 0.28 0.4 0 0.25 0.617 1 
SIZEb (000’s) 623 1,281,660 4,644,407 206,603 525 89,477 779,055 63,520,645 
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Panel C – Correlation table dependent variables  c d e f 
   Method 1 Method2 Method 3 
  
(excluding
middle 33%)
(excluding 
Middle 33%) 
Method 1 Correlation 1 0.153* 0.443* 
(excluding  p-value (2-tailed)  (0.011) (0.000) 
middle 33%) N 306 276 187 
Method2  Correlation 0.153* 1 0.107** 
 p-value (2-tailed) (0.011) (0.053) 
 N 276 520 329 
Method 3 Correlation 0.443* 0.107** 1 
(excluding  p-value (2-tailed) (0.000) (0.053)  
middle 33%) N 187 329 329 
 
*, ** Significant at the 0.01, and 0.05 level respectively. 
a The sample is based on 640 firm years. SCHEME (Method3) is where at least 75% of the top senior executives 
receive the same type of compensation payments, being either cash or equity (Method 2).  All other firm years are 
classified as having an individual compensation scheme, where less than 75% of the senior executives receive the 
same type of compensation payments, being either cash or equity (Method 2);  GEOSEG is the Log of sum of the 
number of geographic segments disclosed in the notes to the annual report; INDSEG is measured using the same 
method as GEOSEG using industry segment sales;  INTAS is measured using the greater of geographic or 
industry segment assets eliminated on consolidation (shared assets) divided by total assets.  The measure is log 
transformed; HOASSET is measured using the proportion of assets specifically allocated to a central management 
function (head office) in the primary segment disclosure to total assets; CAPEX is measured by dividing the 
change in total assets by opening total assets; FUNCST is measured by the number of functional executives on the 
executive team divided by total senior executives.  Functional executives are those where the annual report 
identifies them as having functional responsibility such as being responsible for functional departments such as 
marketing, finance or research and development; SIZE is measured using the log of market capitalization. 
b Before variable is converted using the natural log. 
c The top right of the table reports Pearson correlation coefficients and bottom left Spearman correlation coefficients. 
d The method one classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is based on variation between 
executives in compensation level changes.  See table two for specification how the variable is estimated.  Values 
of 0 and 1 are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
e The method two classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is where at least 75% of the top 
senior executives receive the same type of compensation payments, being either cash bonus or equity / long term 
compensation.  All other firm years are classified as having an individual compensation scheme, where less than 
75% of the senior executives receive the same type of compensation payments, being either cash or equity.  
Reported results exclude firms where no senior executive receive any incentive compensation.  Values of 0 and 1 
are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
f The method three classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is based on the variation between 
executives in incentive compensation levels relative to base pay.  See table two for specification how the variable 
is estimated.  Reported results exclude firms where no senior executive receive any incentive compensation.  
Values of 0 and 1 are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
 
 
Table 6: Univariate test of economic determinants of group versus individual compensation scheme companies a b  
 
Panel A Method one estimated using the similarity between executives in changes in total compensation between years c 
 Predicted 
Individual 
Compensation Scheme 
group 
Group Compensation 
Scheme group 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
Mann-Whitney U test 
 
 Direction N Mean N Mean F (p-value)  t (p-value) Z (p-value) 
GEOSEG - 218 0.707 221 0.676 0.157 (0.693)  0.544 (0.293)  -0.627 (0.265)  
INDSEG - 221 0.757 220 0.631 1.208 (0.272)  2.106 (0.018) * -2.044 (0.020) * 
INTAS + 127 0.008 118 0.010 5.482 (0.020) * -1.024 (0.153)  -0.764 (0.445)  
HOASSET + 127 0.015 118 0.008 3.226 (0.074) ** 0.899 (0.370)  -0.141 (0.888)  
CAPEX + 226 0.147 231 0.128 3.834 (0.051) * 0.747 (0.455)  -0.607 (0.544)  
FUNCST + 59 0.395 51 0.517 1.168 (0.282)  -2.298 (0.012) * -2.159 (0.015) * 
 
Panel B Method two estimated using the similarity in bonus and long term compensation structure d     
 Predicted 
Individual 
Compensation Scheme 
group 
Group Compensation 
Scheme group 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
Mann-Whitney U test 
 
 Direction N Mean N Mean F (p-value) t (p-value) Z (p-value) 
GEOSEG - 239 0.690 252 0.702 3.295 (0.070) ** -0.230 (0.818)  -0.378 (0.705)  
INDSEG - 239 0.654 256 0.750 0.031 (0.861)  -1.671 (0.095)** -1.659 (0.097)** 
INTAS + 144 0.007 135 0.010 15.059 (0.000) * -1.878 (0.031)* -1.642 (0.050)* 
HOASSET + 144 0.012 135 0.019 1.759 (0.093) ** -0.735 (0.231)  -1.272 (0.102)** 
CAPEX + 248 0.123 268 0.158 0.007 (0.466)  -1.454 (0.073)** -1.249 (0.106)  
FUNCST + 64 0.438 63 0.475 0.263 (0.305)  -0.752 (0.227)  -0.985 (0.162)  
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Panel C Method three estimated using the similarity between executives in relative percentage of compensation paid in cash bonus 
plus long term compensation e    
 Predicted 
Individual 
Compensation Scheme 
group 
Group Compensation 
Scheme group 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
Mann-Whitney U test 
 
 Direction N Mean N Mean F (p-value) t (p-value) Z (p-value). 
GEOSEG - 234 0.763 231 0.658 2.059 (0.152)  1.855 (0.032) * -1.814 (0.035)* 
INDSEG - 237 0.803 232 0.632 0.002 (0.965)  2.889 (0.002) * -2.806 (0.003)* 
INTAS + 139 0.008 121 0.009 0.563 (0.454)  -0.303 (0.381)  -0.135 (0.446)  
HOASSET + 139 0.020 121 0.008 5.074 (0.025) * 1.165 (0.245)  -0.576 (0.565)  
CAPEX + 245 0.146 244 0.124 0.228 (0.633)  0.938 (0.348)  -1.097 (0.273)  
FUNCST + 60 0.389 58 0.505 1.605 (0.208)  -2.290 (0.012)* -2.206 (0.014) * 
 
*, ** Significant at the 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
a t-statistics are reported one tailed for variables where there is a directional hypothesis and the coefficient is in the predicted direction (INTAS; HOASSET; 
CAPEX; FUNCST) and two tailed for the remaining variables (Intercept; GEOSEG; INDSEG; SIZE).  
b GEOSEG is the Log of sum of the number of geographic segments disclosed in the notes to the annual report; INDSEG is measured using the same method as 
GEOSEG using industry segment sales; INTAS is measured using the greater of geographic or industry segment assets eliminated on consolidation (shared 
assets) divided by total assets.  The measure is log transformed; HOASSET is measured using the proportion of assets specifically allocated to a central 
management function (head office) in the primary segment disclosure to total assets; CAPEX is measured by dividing the change in total assets by opening total 
assets; FUNCST is measured by the number of functional executives on the executive team divided by total senior executives.  Functional executives are those 
where the annual report identifies them as having functional responsibility such as being responsible for functional departments such as marketing, finance or 
research and development; SIZE is measured using the log of market capitalization. 
c The method one classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is based on variation between executives in compensation level changes.  See 
table two for specification how the variable is estimated.  Values of 0 and 1 are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
d The method two classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is where at least 75% of the top senior executives receive the same type of 
compensation payments, being either cash bonus or equity / long term compensation.  All other firm years are classified as having an individual compensation 
scheme, where less than 75% of the senior executives receive the same type of compensation payments, being either cash or equity.  Reported results exclude 
firms where no senior executive receive any incentive compensation.  Values of 0 and 1 are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
e The method three classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is based on the variation between executives in incentive compensation levels 
relative to base pay.  See table two for specification how the variable is estimated.  Reported results exclude firms where no senior executive receive any 
incentive compensation.  Values of 0 and 1 are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
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Table 7:  
Estimated Logit binomial regression models of the choice between group versus individual compensation schemes for the senior executives. a b   
 
Model 1: 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 6 , 6 , 1 ,SCHEME GEOSEG INDSEG INTAS HOASSET CAPEX FUNKST SIZE Industry Yearit i t i t i t i t i t i t i t n i n i i tα α α α α α α α α α ε− − − − −= + + + + + + + + + +  
 
Model2:
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 6 , , 1 7 , 1 ,SCHEME GEOSEG INDSEG INTAS HOASSET CAPEX CAPEX INDSEG SIZE Industry Yearit i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t n i n i i tα α α α α α α α α α ε− − − − − −= + + + + + + × + + + +  
 
Panel A Method one estimated based on variation between executives in compensation level changes c 
Regression coefficients (p-value ) 
  Model 1  
Model 1 
excluding 
FUNCST Model 2 Model 1  
Model 1 
excluding 
FUNCST Model 2 Model 2 
Model 2 
excluding 
FUNCST  
Variables in 
the Equation c
Predicted 
sign     
Excluding middle 
33%  
Excluding 
middle 33% 
Excluding middle 
33% 
Standard 
Deviation of 
10% used as cut
off Standard 
Deviation of 
10% used as cut  
Intercept  105.539  -13.286  105.749  -75.800  -10.893  -75.668  84.889  -22.527  
  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (0.999)  
GEOSEG - 0.265  0.089  0.278  0.066  -0.151  0.070  -0.830  -0.349  
  (0.611)  (0.725)  (0.299)  (0.937)  (0.333)  (0.934)  (0.135)  (0.152)  
INDSEG - -0.652  -0.661 * -0.713  -2.119 * -0.956 * -2.145 * 1.315  0.206  
  (0.114)  (0.006)  (0.122)  (0.026)  (0.006)  (0.030)  (0.238)  (0.612)  
INTAS + 26.339  18.739 * 26.249  44.881  42.271 * 44.265  35.562 ** 18.708 ** 
  (0.112)  (0.035)  (0.112)  (0.115)  (0.002)  (0.122)  (0.084)  (0.074)  
HOASSET + -6.278  -2.284  -6.327  -142.658  -1.333  -143.062  -178.022  -3.645  
  (0.220)  (0.422)  (0.437)  (0.998)  (0.679)  (0.998)  (0.998)  (0.557)  
CAPEX + 1.328  -0.126  1.097  -0.156  -1.945 * -0.243  3.283 ** 0.030  
  (0.150)  (0.825)  (0.254)  (0.931)  (0.016)  (0.909)  (0.057)  (0.488)  
FUNCST + 2.212 *   2.264 * 2.721 **   2.726 ** 0.267    
  (0.036)    (0.036)  (0.093)    (0.092)  (0.427)    
INDSEG * 
CAPEX -     0.419      0.243  -4.600 ** -1.511  
      (0.827)      (0.938)  (0.065)  (0.119)  
SIZE ? -0.783  -0.095  -0.792  -0.568  -0.256  -0.577  -1.021  -0.407  
  (0.142)  (0.703)  (0.139)  (0.495)  (0.457)  (0.493)  (0.255)  (0.245)  
                  
Nagelkerke R 
Square  0.356  0.121  0.356  0.531  0.242  0.531  0.292  0.111  
n  77  231  77  47  142  47  77  231  
 51
Panel B: Method two estimated using the similarity in bonus and long term compensation structure d 
Regression coefficients (p-value ) 
Variables in the 
Equation c 
Predicted 
sign Model 1  
Model 1 
excluding 
FUNCST  
Model 1 
excluding 
SIZE  Model 2  
Intercept  92.102  119.393  100.434  89.23  
  (1.000)  (0.999)  (1.000)  (1.000)  
GEOSEG - 0.484  0.364  0.555  .465  
  (0.266)  (0.118)  (0.204)  (0.294)  
INDSEG - 0.623  0.244  0.883 * .997 ** 
  (0.173)  (0.316)  (0.040)  (0.063)  
INTAS + 39.842 * 17.388 * 36.623 * 43.483 * 
  (0.021)  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.015)  
HOASSET + 11.197 * 1.213  11.072 * 11.695 * 
  (0.020)  (0.215)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
CAPEX + 1.351  0.984 * 1.418 ** 2.882 * 
  (0.106)  (0.028)  (0.090)  (0.024)  
FUNCST + 0.147    0.002  -.218  
  (0.443)    (0.499)  (0.837)  
INDSEG * CAPEX -       -2.754 * 
        (0.052)  
SIZE ? 0.560  0.445 **   .615  
  (0.239)  (0.061)    (0.203)  
          
Nagelkerke R 
Square  0.36  0.136  0.349  0.389  
No. of observations  91  264  93  91  
 
 52
Panel C: Method three estimated based on the variation between executives in incentive compensation levels relative to base pay e   
Regression coefficients (p-value ) 
  Model 1  
Model 1 
excluding 
FUNCST  Model 2  Model 1  
Model 1 
excluding 
FUNCST  Model 2 Model 2  
Variables in the 
Equation c 
Predicted 
sign       
Excluding 
middle 33%  
Excluding 
middle 33%  
Excluding 
middle 33%  
Standard Deviation 
of 10% used as cut-
off  
Intercept  -107.756  5.780  -112.088  -10.838  -17.470  -14.600  84.581  
  (1.000)  (0.404)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  
GEOSEG - 0.900** 0.260  0.928** 1.387  0.217  1.301  0.339  
  (0.081)  (0.277)  (0.088)  (0.110)  (0.486)  (0.133)  (0.512)  
INDSEG - -0.722** -0.283  -0.387  -1.440* -0.429** -1.383* -0.756** 
  (0.071)  (0.128)  (0.240)  (0.039)  (0.086)  (0.047)  (0.089)  
INTAS + 29.202  12.924** 43.740* 3.798  5.179  12.311  14.209  
  (0.106)  (0.096)  (0.048)  (0.452)  (0.338)  (0.359)  (0.262)  
HOASSET + -8.448  -2.600  -8.392  -16.900  -2.897  -15.989  -8.834  
  (0.374)  (0.298)  (0.387)  (0.283)  (0.448)  (0.306)  (0.394)  
CAPEX + -0.183  -0.672  2.627** 1.587  -0.076  2.598  1.419  
  (0.875)  (0.209)  (0.072)  (0.207)  (0.910)  (0.141)  (0.194)  
FUNCST + 2.360*   1.747** 4.093*   3.805* 1.338  
  (0.035)    (0.103)  (0.028)    (0.039)  (0.156)  
INDSEG * 
CAPEX -     -4.748*     -2.247  -0.992  
      (0.013)      (0.224)  (0.303)  
SIZE  -1.222* -0.547* -1.169* -1.336** -0.769* -1.098  -1.155** 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.049)  (0.102)  (0.014)  (0.202)  (0.068)  
                
Nagelkerke R Square 0.383  0.095 0.450  0.563  0.165  0.571  0.381  
n  83  245  83  58  165  58  83  
 
*, ** Significant at the 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
a t-statistics are reported one tailed for variables where there is a directional hypothesis and the coefficient is in the predicted direction (INTAS; HOASSET; 
CAPEX; FUNCST) and two tailed for the remaining variables (Intercept; GEOSEG; INDSEG; SIZE).  
b All aggregated firm year observations are from the sample of 640 firm years where data was available at the time of compilation.  GEOSEG is the Log of sum 
of the number of geographic segments disclosed in the notes to the annual report; INDSEG is measured using the same method as GEOSEG using industry 
segment sales; INTAS is measured using the greater of geographic or industry segment assets eliminated on consolidation (shared assets) divided by total 
assets.  The measure is log transformed; HOASSET is measured using the proportion of assets specifically allocated to a central management function (head 
office) in the primary segment disclosure to total assets; CAPEX is measured by dividing the change in total assets by opening total assets; FUNCST is 
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measured by the number of functional executives on the executive team divided by total senior executives.  Functional executives are those where the annual 
report identifies them as having functional responsibility such as being responsible for functional departments such as marketing, finance or research and 
development; SIZE is measured using the log of market capitalization; INDUSTRY is a dummy variable for each industry; YEAR is a dummy variable for 
each year. 
c The method one classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is based on variation between executives in compensation level changes.  See 
table two for specification how the variable is estimated.  Values of 0 and 1 are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
d The method two classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is where at least 75% of the top senior executives receive the same type of 
compensation payments, being either cash bonus or equity / long term compensation.  All other firm years are classified as having an individual compensation 
scheme, where less than 75% of the senior executives receive the same type of compensation payments, being either cash or equity.  Reported results exclude 
firms where no senior executive receive any incentive compensation.  Values of 0 and 1 are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
e The method three classification for predominantly group compensation schemes is based on the variation between executives in incentive compensation levels 
relative to base pay.  See table two for specification how the variable is estimated.  Reported results exclude firms where no senior executive receive any 
incentive compensation.  Values of 0 and 1 are assigned individual and group compensation firms respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Alternative specification of firm characteristics for sensitivity testing 
Variable Alternative Variable Name Alternative specification 
GEOSEG GEOHERF 
 
Geographic diversification is measured using a Herfindahl index 
of diversification calculated using the geographic segment 
disclosure note (Bushman et al, 2004).  The index is calculated 
using the sum of the square of each geographic segment sales.  
The sum the squares is then divided by total firm sales, providing 
a measure of geographic segmentation between 0 and 1.  The 
index approaches 0 the greater the level of diversification.   
INDSEG INDHERF Industry diversification is measured using the same method as 
GEOHERF using industry segment sales.   
INTAS INTSAL Interdependencies related to inter-segment transactions is 
measured using the greater of geographic or industry segment 
sales eliminated on consolidation (Bushman et al, 1995).  The 
measure is the proportion of inter-segment sales to total sales.   
FUNCST DIVST Divisional structure is measured by the number of divisional 
executives on the executive team divided by total senior 
executives.  Divisional executives are those where the annual 
report identifies them as having divisional responsibility such as 
being responsible for an integrated business unit. 
FUNCST FUNCSTExlAnyDiv This FUNCST after any executive with dual functional and 
divisional roles are removed.     
CAPEX  CFCAPEX Net capital expended on property plant and equipment from the 
cash flow statement divided by total assets.   
CAPEX  CAPEX3yr 
 
OR 
 
AvCFCAPEX3yr 
Average of 3 years of CAPEX 
 
 
 
Average of 3 years of CFCAPEX 
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Table 9: Alternative control variables for sensitivity testing 
Variable Variable Name Proxy Used 
Executive share 
ownership 
EXECEQ 
 
 
 
CEOEQ 
Total shares controlled by all executives (except the 
CEO) during the year multiplied by share price at end 
of the year, divided by market capitalisation. 
 
Total shares controlled by the CEO during the year 
multiplied by share price at end of the year, divided by 
market capitalisation. 
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Appendix one: Example of compensation and segment disclosure in reports 
 
TOLL Holdings  
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Appendix two: Empirical evidence on group compensation schemes 
Kandel and Lazear (1992) also provide empirical evidence that employees are influenced 
by peer pressure from fellow employees and that peer pressure is a more effective motivator in 
firms where profits are shared.   
Hambrick (1995) reports that in one large US company, the CEO adopted a group 
compensation scheme in order to increase the level of co-operation and co-ordination within the 
senior executive team, leading to increased collaboration and ‘success in their market’ within a 
three year period.   
Drake, Haka and Ravenscroft (1999) investigate the proposition that group compensation 
schemes are likely to lead to greater operating performance compared to individual 
compensation schemes using an experiment.  They found that the teams with group 
compensation, in combination with increased cost related information, had ‘higher incentives to 
cooperate, they initiated more cooperative innovations, had lower production costs and higher 
profits’ than other groups.  They find that the teams with individual compensation and increased 
cost related information engaged in negative self serving actions leading to self benefiting 
innovations and had higher costs and lower profits than any other combination of cost system 
and compensation scheme.   
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) found that in one large US manufacturing plant, 
highly productive employees were more likely to voluntarily switch from an individual piece rate 
compensation scheme to a group compensation schemes when given the choice.  There was no 
difference in turnover rates for highly productive workers, despite receiving an average drop in 
pay of 8%.  Average staff turnover rates (a measure of job satisfaction) decreased and 
productivity increased significantly with the voluntary adoption of a group compensation scheme 
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in this case.  Despite the separability of input and output to individuals, group compensation in 
this case was an efficient choice over individual compensation. 
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